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SPEECH AND LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY. By Franklyn s. Haiman. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1981. Pp. x, 481. $22.50. 
Franklyn S. Haiman's Speech and Law In a Free Society examines the 
interplay of forces that constrain and encourage "freedom of expression" 1 
in American society. Haiman's book does not offer well-defined rules of 
law or clear indications of likely judicial outcomes in first amendment 
cases. Rather, it focuses on what the author believes the law should be. 
Haiman acknowledges the "lack of consensus in our society concerning the 
basic purposes and values underlying the First Amendment" (p. 5), and 
offers a thorough analysis of many current first amendment issues based 
upon his own values. Readers interested in democratic theory, as well as 
the uninitiated seeking exposure to first amendment issues will find 
Haiman's assertions of his values and principles useful catalysts in the pre-
cipitation of their own perspectives on the first amendment. 
Haiman begins by outlining the values and principles underlying his 
theories. He then discusses a multitude of interests that compete with free-
dom of expression, analyzing them in light of the values he asserts. Haiman 
outlines the historical progression of court decisions relating to each issue, 
and then theorizes about what the law should be. 
Haiman concludes his analysis by proposing four principles for resolv-
ing conflicts between freedom of expression and other competing interests 
(pp. 425-26): (1) the·remedy for injury caused by speech should be more 
speech; (2) individuals in a free society are responsible for their own behav-
ior, unless deprived of free choice by deception, physical coercion or mental 
impairment; (3) if the market place of ideas remains open, individuals are 
the best judges of their own interests; and (4) government must have a com-
pelling justification whenever it requires unwilling communication or with-
holds information it possesses. Haiman admits that a society that honored 
these principles would not suit the "squeamish or apathetic" (p. 429). 
In general, Haiman's concluding principles effectively synthesize both 
his own normative analysis and the principles of classic liberal political the-
ory from which they derive.2 Some of his more radical claims, however, 
conflict not only with widely held liberal values but with other portions of 
his argument as well. 
Haiman concludes, for example, that the principle of repairing injury 
I. Haiman chooses to consider "speech" and "the press" as "identical twins,'' deserving of 
the same constitutional protection. The word "expression" is used here to include both terms. 
Haiman does not concentrate on this point; he discusses the possible constitutional distinctions 
between the terms only briefly. He is quite prepared to accept "a bit of constitutional redun-
dancy" (p. 15) to avoid any confusion that might exist if the terms were accorded different 
treatment. Former Justice Potter Stewart argues for separate treatment for speech and the 
press. See Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975); see also w. BERNS, THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1976). 
2. Much ofHaiman's thought can be traced to Mill, and the gist of many of his arguments 
for free expression to Milton's classic argument against the licensing of books. See generally J. 
s. MILL, ON LIBERTY, in XVIII WORKS 213 (J. Robson ed. 1977); J. MILTON, AREOPAGlTlCA 
(R. Jebb ed. 1918). 
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caused by free speech with more speech justifies a major retrenchment in 
the law of defamation (pp. 43-60). Haiman argues for conditioning defama-
tion actions for damages on the defendant's refusal to retract or furnish a 
forum for reply, and for eliminating the "reckless disregard" element of the 
New York Times standard,3 thus requiring proof of knowing falsity before 
a plaintiff could recover. Reliance on the right to reply assumes that replies 
by the defamed can restore their reputations, and that enforcement of the 
right will be less coercive than a damage remedy. Haiman concedes that 
certain libels may inflict irreparable injury, and that the denial of wrongdo-
ing by the subject of suspicion is less credible than judgment of an impartial 
court to the same effect. He would retain the damage remedy for those 
cases (few in number, he believes) of irreparable injury, and trust the pub-
lic's perception of the truth (as we do with politics and religion) to mitigate 
the need for judicial intervention. The defense, while admirable, is 
unconvincing. 
The right to reply remedy is largely illusory. As a unanimous Supreme 
Court pointed out in Tomillo,4 an enforced right to reply will chill and 
displace speech as readily as any other form of censorship. Conditioning 
libel suits on the denial of reply space or time by the defendant might pass 
the test of constitutionality under Tomi/lo, but only because the remedy 
could be rejected by the defendant. If the underlying reasoning of Tomi/lo 
is correct, as Haiman appears to concede, defendants will either categori-
cally opt for a court contest (if the costs of litigation, including the risk of 
judgment, are less than the costs of publishing replies) or, more likely, sim-
ply avoid any communication that might provoke the demand for reply 
space (if the costs of reply exceed the benefits of controversial speech). The 
result would be either a uniform fall-back on current defamation law, or the 
serious restraint of vigorous debate on controversial issues implicating per-
sonal reputations. In the latter scenario, truth and falsehood would grapple 
only in the minds of cautious journalists, and the public would never get the 
chance to exercise its judgment. 
As for modifying the New York Times standard, reckless disregard 
comes into play only given proof of actual falsity.5 If knowingly false 
speech deserves no constitutional protection, as Haiman concedes, the con-
stitutional case for reckless falsehood rests on little stronger ground. 
Whatever the motivation behind it, falsity cannot advance the search for 
truth, or expose actual political misconduct. Chilling reckless expression in 
general is costly only insofar as reckless expression leads to truth rather 
than to falsehood, and then only if the exercise of due care would not also 
lead to the truth - a rare coincidence. Given the nearly impossible burden 
of proving actual knowledge of falsity, that cost is more than justified. 
Refusing to hold individuals liable for damages inflicted by defamatory 
falsehoods is also somewhat at odds with Haiman's second principle, that 
individuals should be responsible for their own behavior.6 Requiring only 
3. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 255 (1964). 
4. Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
5. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 78 ("the New York Times rule ••• absolutely 
prohibits punishment of truthful criticism"). 
6. Haiman develops his principle of individual responsibility in his discussion of audience 
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a right to reply would do little to bring reckless representatives of the media 
to account, and nothing at all to confront nonmedia defendants with the 
consequences of their actions. More profoundly, to the extent that the lib-
eral tradition of free expression derives from the desire to restrain concen-
trated power, Haiman's belief in the power of solitary truth to counteract 
mass falsehood contradicts the fundamental premise of his argument. If 
communication has power to check government7 it also has power to injure 
individuals. Restraints on private as well as public power can contribute to 
the individual autonomy Haiman views as fundamental. 
Though Haiman's arguments sometimes lack any substance greater than 
Jeffersonian faith in the people, his book succeeds in its ultimate goal: it 
offers a careful analysis of some of the most troublesome issues involving 
freedom of expression. The book will aid readers in "crystallizing their 
own alternative [approaches] to those issues" (p. 6). One may benefit from 
the breadth and thoroughness of his analysis even if one differs fundamen-
tally with Haiman's political starting point. Although many well-written 
publications8 have focused on the first amendment, Speech and Law in a 
Free Society offers an up-to-date and unflinching approach to many of the 
most controversial challenges to freedom of expression facing the courts 
today. Haiman does not attempt a new or innovative approach to constitu-
tional analysis, but he does present the issues clearly and coherently. He 
identifies and discusses many of the values of other first amendment schol-
ars, but he does not seek to replace them. Instead, he proposes his own set 
of values to set, with the values of other scholars, among the "foundation 
stones of our First Amendment edifice" (p. 443 n.6). Haiman's perspective 
and convictions are thought-provoking at the very least, and may someday 
set the course for an American society better prepared to weather the "bois-
terous sea of liberty" (p. 429) which Haiman would have us sail.9 
violence in reaction to the ideas of a controversial speaker. He argues convincingly that the 
members of the audience who resort to violence should be held responsible for their actions, 
not the inciting speaker (pp. 252-83). He also does not argue that injury done by defamatory 
communication should be the responsibility of the communicator (pp. 87-99). 
7. For this refinement of Meiklejohn's self-government rationale advanced in FREE 
SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948), see Blasi, The Checking Value in 
First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. BAR. FEDN. RES. J. 521. 
8. See, e.g., w. BERNS,supra n.2; z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH INTHE UNITED STATES (1941); 
T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970); L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPRES-
SION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY (1960). 
9. Haiman's book is also reviewed by Boylan, Book Review, 20 COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. 
59 (1982); Cantor, Book Review, LIBRARY J., Dec. 15, 1982, at 2380. 
